The non-escalating envelope approach in Firecracker is a great way to handle agent drift. I noticed you’re using HMAC approval tokens for gated ops—how are you handling the entropy source for those secrets?
One edge case in agent security is 'Entropy Exhaustion' or prediction if the microVM environment is compromised. I’ve been looking at anchoring HMAC generation to decentralized randomness beacons (like Drand) to ensure that even if an agent compromises the local environment, it can't predict or pre-mine the next set of 'valid' tokens because the entropy hasn't been released by the network yet.
Have you thought about moving the 'Root of Trust' for your HMAC tokens outside the local microVM entirely?The non-escalating envelope approach in Firecracker is a great way to handle agent drift. I noticed you’re using HMAC approval tokens for gated ops—how are you handling the entropy source for those secrets?
One edge case in agent security is 'Entropy Exhaustion' or prediction if the microVM environment is compromised. I’ve been looking at anchoring HMAC generation to decentralized randomness beacons (like Drand) to ensure that even if an agent compromises the local environment, it can't predict or pre-mine the next set of 'valid' tokens because the entropy hasn't been released by the network yet.
Have you thought about moving the 'Root of Trust' for your HMAC tokens outside the local microVM entirely?
Very interesting use of Firecracker for agent isolation.
How do you handle network identity for the agents themselves?
Are you using something like mTLS/SPIFFE to identify the workload inside the VM, or is it purely network-policy based at the host level?
Can you explain the "runtime enforcement" and the "enforcing tool proxy?
Thanks! Currently network identity is host-based, but in the middle of introducing SPIFFE based on ZTunnel. Should be done in the next couple of days.
Runtime enforcement means that any side effects are routed through a proxy (nucleus-tool-proxy) that does realtime checks on permissions and gates the behavior.
SPIFFE for MicroVM agents is a compelling idea and I'll update when this is ready.
The non-escalating envelope approach in Firecracker is a great way to handle agent drift. I noticed you’re using HMAC approval tokens for gated ops—how are you handling the entropy source for those secrets?
One edge case in agent security is 'Entropy Exhaustion' or prediction if the microVM environment is compromised. I’ve been looking at anchoring HMAC generation to decentralized randomness beacons (like Drand) to ensure that even if an agent compromises the local environment, it can't predict or pre-mine the next set of 'valid' tokens because the entropy hasn't been released by the network yet.
Have you thought about moving the 'Root of Trust' for your HMAC tokens outside the local microVM entirely?The non-escalating envelope approach in Firecracker is a great way to handle agent drift. I noticed you’re using HMAC approval tokens for gated ops—how are you handling the entropy source for those secrets?
One edge case in agent security is 'Entropy Exhaustion' or prediction if the microVM environment is compromised. I’ve been looking at anchoring HMAC generation to decentralized randomness beacons (like Drand) to ensure that even if an agent compromises the local environment, it can't predict or pre-mine the next set of 'valid' tokens because the entropy hasn't been released by the network yet.
Have you thought about moving the 'Root of Trust' for your HMAC tokens outside the local microVM entirely?
Very interesting use of Firecracker for agent isolation.
How do you handle network identity for the agents themselves? Are you using something like mTLS/SPIFFE to identify the workload inside the VM, or is it purely network-policy based at the host level? Can you explain the "runtime enforcement" and the "enforcing tool proxy?
Thanks! Currently network identity is host-based, but in the middle of introducing SPIFFE based on ZTunnel. Should be done in the next couple of days.
Runtime enforcement means that any side effects are routed through a proxy (nucleus-tool-proxy) that does realtime checks on permissions and gates the behavior.
SPIFFE for MicroVM agents is a compelling idea and I'll update when this is ready.