I think this is solving a real operational pain point, definitely one that I've experienced. My biggest hesitation here is the direct exposure of the managing account identity not that I need to protect the accounts key material, I already need to do that.
While "usernames" are not generally protected to the same degree as credentials, they do matter and act as an important gate to even know about before a real attack can commence. This also provides the ability to associate random found credentials back to the sites you can now issue certificates for if they're using the same account. This is free scope expansion for any breach that occurs.
I guarantee sites like Shodan will start indexing these IDs on all domains they look at to provide those reverse lookup services.
CAA records including an accounturi already expose the account identity in the same manner, so I feel like that ship has already sailed somewhat (and I would prefer that the CAA and persist record formats match).
Exactly. They should provide the user with a list of UUIDs(or any other randomish ID tied to the actual account) that can be used in the accounturi URL for these operations.
I think the previous post is talking about a search that will find the sibling domain names that have obtained certificates with the same account ID. That is a strong indication that those domains are in the same certificate renewal pipeline, most likely on the same physical/virtual server.
Run ACME inside a Docker container, one instance (and credentials) for each domain name. Doesn't consume much resources. The real problem is IP addresses anyway, CT logs "thankfully" feed information to every bad actor in real time, which makes data mining trivially easy.
This is going to make it way easier to get publicly trusted certs for LAN servers that aren't internet facing.
I'm looking forward to every admin UI out there being able to generate a string you can just paste into a DNS record to instantly get a Let's Encrypt cert.
In the meantime, if you use bind as your authoritative nameserver, you can limit an hmac-secret to one TXT record, so each webserver that uses rfc2136 for certificate renewals is only capable of updating its specific record:
key "bob.acme." {
algorithm hmac-sha512;
secret "blahblahblah";
};
key "joe.acme." {
algorithm hmac-sha512;
secret "blahblahblah2";
};
zone "example.com" IN {
type master;
file "/var/lib/bind/example.com.zone";
update-policy {
grant bob.acme. name _acme-challenge.bob.acme.example.com. TXT;
grant joe.acme. name _acme-challenge.joe.acme.example.com. TXT;
};
key-directory "/var/lib/bind/keys-acme.example.com";
dnssec-policy "acme";
inline-signing yes;
};
I like this because it means an attacker who compromises "bob" can only get certs for "bob". The server part looks like this:
I've changed my mind about the short lived cert stuff after seeing what is enabled by IP address certificates with the HTTP-01 verification method. I don't even bother writing the cert to disk anymore. There is a background thread that checks to see if the current instance of the cert is null or older than 24h. The cert selector on aspnetcore just looks at this reference and blocks until its not null.
Being able to distribute self-hostable software to users that can be deployed onto a VM and made operational literally within 5 minutes is a big selling point. Domain registration & DNS are a massive pain to deal with at the novice end of the spectrum. You can combine this with things like https://checkip.amazonaws.com to build properly turnkey solutions.
There are also a bunch of rate limit exemptions that automatically apply whenever you "renew" a cert: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/#non-ari-renewals. That means whenever you request a cert and there already is an issued certificate for the same set of identities.
Yeessss! This should finally make certificates for internal only web services actually easier to orchestrate than before ACME. This closes probably the biggest operational pain point I've had with letsencrypt/modern web certificates.
After having to deal with VM hosts that do GeoIP blocking, which unintentionally blocks Let's Encrypt and others from properly verifying domains via http-01/tls-alpn-01, I settled on a DIY solution that uses CNAME redirects and a custom, minimal DNS server for handling the redirected dns-01 challenges. It's essentially a greatly simplified version of the acme-dns project tailored to my project's needs (and written in node.js instead of Go).
Unfortunately with dns-persist-01 including account information in the DNS record itself, that's a bit of a show stopper for me. If/when account information changes, that means DNS records need changing and getting clients to update their DNS records (for any reason) has long been a pain.
There's a missing part here, and that's validating your ACME account ownership.
I think most users depend on automation that creates their accounts, so they never have to deal with it. But now, you need to propagate some credential to validate your account ownership to the ACME provider. I would have liked to see some conversation about that in this announcement.
I'm not familiar with Let's Encrypt's authentication model. If they don't have token creation that can be limited by target domain, but I expect you'll need to create separate accounts for each of your target domains, or else anything with that secret can create a cert for any domain your account controls.
> There's a missing part here, and that's validating your ACME account ownership.
Why? ACME accounts have credentials so that the ACME client can authenticate against the certificate issuer, and ACME providers require the placement of a DNS record or a .well-known HTTP endpoint to verify that the account is authorized to act upon the demands of whoever owns the domain.
If either your ACME credentials leak out or, even worse, someone manages to place DNS records or hijack your .well-known endpoint, you got far bigger problems at hand than someone being able to mis-issue SSL certificates under your domain name.
I'm surprised the ballot passed, unanimously even! I get that storing the DNS credentials in the certificate renewal pipeline is risky, but many DNS providers have granular API access controls, so it is already possible to limit the surface area in case the keys get leaked. Plus, you can revoke the keys easily.
The ACME account credentials are also accessible by the same renewal pipelines that has the DNS API credentials, so this does not provide any new isolation.
~It's also not quite clear how to revoke this challenge, and how domain expiration deal with this. The DNS record contents should have been at least the HMAC of the account key, the FQDN, and something that will invalidate if the domain is transferred somewhere else. The leaf DNSSEC key would have been perfect, but DNSSEC key rotation is also quite broken, so it wouldn't play nice.~
Is there a way to limit the challenge types with CAA records? You can limit it by an account number, and I believe that is the most tight control you have so far.
---
Edit: thanks to the replies to this comment, I learned that this would provide invalidation simply by removing the DNS record, and that the DNS records are checked at renewal time with a much shorter validation TTL.
> but many DNS providers have granular API access controls
And many providers don't. (Even big ones that are supposedly competent like Cloudflare.)
And basically everyone who uses granular API keys are storing a cleartext key, which is no better and possibly worse than storing a credential for an ACME account.
> It's also not quite clear how to revoke this challenge, and how domain expiration deal with this
CAs can cache the record lookup for no longer than 10 days. After 10 days, they have to check it again. If the record is gone, which would be expected if the domain has expired or been transferred, then the authorization is no longer valid.
(I would have preferred a much shorter limit, like 8 hours, but 10 days is a lot better than the current 398 day limit for the original ACME DNS validation method.)
This wasn’t the first version of the ballot, so there was substantial work to get consensus on a ballot before the vote.
CAs were already doing something like this (CNAME to a dns server controlled by the CA), so there was interest from everyone involved to standardize and decide on what the rules should be.
Yes, you can limit both challenge types and account URIs in CAA records.
To revoke the record, delete it from DNS. Let’s Encrypt queries authoritative nameservers with caches capped at 1 minute. Authorizations that have succeeded will soon be capped at 7 hours, though that’s independent of this challenge.
Here, certbot runs in Docker in the intranet, and on a VPS I have a custom-built nameserver to which all the _acme-challenge are redirected to via NS records.
The system in the intranet starts certbot, makes it pass it the token-domain-pair from letsencrypt, it then sends those pairs to the nameserver which then attaches the token to a TXT record for that domain, so that the DNS reply can send this to letsencrypt when they request it.
All that will be gone and I thank you for that! You add as much value to the internet as Wikipedia or OpenStreetMap.
I'm really excited for this. We moved 120+ hand renewed certs to ACME, but still manually validate the domains annually. Many of them are on private/internal load balancers (no HTTP-01 challenge possible), and our DNS host doesn't support automation (no DNS-01 challenges either). While manually renewing the DCV for ~30 domains once a year isn't too bad, when the lifetime of that validity shrinks, ultimately to 9 days, it'd become a full time job. I just hope Sectigo implements this as quickly as LE.
This adds a new validation method that people can use if they want. The existing validation methods (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/) aren't going away, so your current setup will keep working.
And to elaborate, the reasons you might want to use a DNS challenge are to acquire wildcard certificates, or to acquire regular certificates on a machine or domain which isn't directly internet-facing. If neither of those apply to you then the regular HTTP/TLS methods are fine.
OK I was sort of thinking that might be the case but wanted to make sure in case I had to start prepping now, thanks. We use no wildcard domains today, maybe down the road.
> The timestamp is expressed as UTC seconds since 1970-01-01
That should be TAI, right? Is that really correct or do they actually mean unix timestamps (those shift with leap seconds unlike TAI which is actually just the number of seconds that have passed since 1970001Z)?
Do leap seconds even matter here? Doing anything involving DNS or certificates in a way that requires clock synchronization down to the second would seem to be asking for trouble.
To get a Let's Encrypt wildcard cert, I ended up running my own DNS server with dnsmasq and delegating the _acme-challenge subdomain to it.
Pasting a challenge string once and letting its continued presence prove continued ownership of a domain is a great step forward. But I agree with others that there is absolutely no reason to expose account numbers; it should be a random ID associated with the account in Let's Encrypt's database.
As a workaround, you should probably make a new account for each domain.
You bothered to manage your LE accounts? I only say because when using the other two challenge types with most deployment scenarios you were generating a new account per cert so your account ID was just a string of random numbers.
I wonder why they switched from a super-secure-super-complex (in terms of operations) way of doing DNS auth to a super-simple-no-cryptography-involved method that just relies on the account id.
Why not using some public/private key auth where the dns contains a public key and the requesting server uses the private key to sign the cert request? This would decouple the authorization from the actual account. It would not reveal the account's identity. It could be used with multiple account (useful for a wildcard on the DNS plus several independent systems requesting certs for subdomains).
The most common vector for DNS-based attacks on issuance is compromised registrar accounts, and no matter how complicated you make the cryptography, if you're layering it onto the DNS, those attacks will preempt the cryptography.
Because LE keeps a mapping of account ids to emails and public keys. You have to have the private key to the ACME account to issue a cert. The cryptography is still there but the dance is done by certbot behind the scenes.
Prior to this accounts were nearly pointless as proof of control was checked every time so people (rightfully) just threw away the account key LE generated for them. Now if you use PERSIST you have to keep it around and deploy it to servers you want to be able to issue certs.
Is it possible to create an ACME account without requesting a certificate? AFAICT is is not so you cannot use this method unless you have first requested a certificate with some other method. I hope I am wrong!
An account needs to be created before you can request a certificate. Some ACME clients might create the account for you implicitly when you request the first certificate, but in the background it still needs to start by registering an account.
`certbot register` followed by `certbot show_account` is how you'd do this with certbot.
Years ago, I had a really fubar shell script for generating the DNS-01 records on my own (non-cloud) run authoritative nameserver. It "worked," but its reliability was highly questionable.
I like this DNS-PERSIST fixes that.
But I don't understand why they chose to include the account as a plain-text string in the DNS record. Seems they could have just as easily used a randomly generated key that wouldn't mean anything to anyone outside Let's Encrypt, and without exposing my account to every privacy-invasive bot and hacker.
> they could have just as easily used a randomly generated key
Isn't that pretty much what an accounturi is in the context of ACME? Who goes around manually creating Let's Encrypt accounts and re-using them on every server they manage?
Those who choose to use DNS-PERSIST-01 should fully commit to automation and create one LetsEncrypt account per FQDN (or at least per loadbalancer), using a UUID as username.
There is no username in ACME besides the account URI, so the UUID you’re suggesting isn’t needed. The account uri themselves just have a number (db primary key).
If you’re worried about correlating between domains, then yes just make multiple accounts.
There is an email field in ACME account registration but we don’t persist that since we dropped sending expiry emails.
Once again I would like to ask CA/B to permit name constrained, short lifespan, automatically issued intermediate CAs. Last year's request: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43563676
Interesting. Think a lot of the security headaches went away for me when I discovered providers like CF can restrict the scope of tokens to a single domain and lock it to my IP.
This might be the first time in ten years that a certificate proposal intends to make issuing certificates more reasonable and not less. More of this, less of 7-day-lifetime stupidity.
"Support for the draft specification is available now in Pebble, a miniature version of Boulder, our production CA software. Work is also in progress on a lego-cli client implementation to make it easier for subscribers to experiment with and adopt. Staging rollout is planned for late Q1 2026, with a production rollout targeted for some time in Q2 2026."
We then can just staple the Persist DNS key to the certificate itself.
And then we just need to cut out the middleman and add a new IETF standard for browsers to directly validate the certificates, as long as they confirm the DNS response using DNSSEC.
This decreases the salience of DANE/DNSSEC by taking DNS queries off the per-issuance critical path. Attackers targeting multitenant platforms get only a small number of bites at the apple in this model.
DNS queries are still part of the critical path, as let's encrypt needs to check that the username is still allowed to receive a cert before each issuance.
Sure. It's yet another advantage of doing True DANE. But it still requires DNS to be reliable for the certificate issuance to work, there's no way around it.
So why not cut out the middleman?
(And the answer right now is "legacy compatibility")
When you shoot yourself in the foot with DNSSEC, you typically end up with a non-working setup.
The biggest problem is that DNS replies are often cached, so fixes for the mistakes can take a while to propagate. With Let's Encrypt you typically can fix stuff right away if something fails.
When you shoot yourself in the foot with DNSSEC, your entire domain falls of the Internet, as if it had never existed in the first place. It's basically the worst possible case failure and it's happened to multiple large shops; Slack being the most notorious recent example.
I think this is solving a real operational pain point, definitely one that I've experienced. My biggest hesitation here is the direct exposure of the managing account identity not that I need to protect the accounts key material, I already need to do that.
While "usernames" are not generally protected to the same degree as credentials, they do matter and act as an important gate to even know about before a real attack can commence. This also provides the ability to associate random found credentials back to the sites you can now issue certificates for if they're using the same account. This is free scope expansion for any breach that occurs.
I guarantee sites like Shodan will start indexing these IDs on all domains they look at to provide those reverse lookup services.
CAA records including an accounturi already expose the account identity in the same manner, so I feel like that ship has already sailed somewhat (and I would prefer that the CAA and persist record formats match).
Exactly. They should provide the user with a list of UUIDs(or any other randomish ID tied to the actual account) that can be used in the accounturi URL for these operations.
The account is the same as you create in any acme client. I don't see potential for a reverse lookup.
I think the previous post is talking about a search that will find the sibling domain names that have obtained certificates with the same account ID. That is a strong indication that those domains are in the same certificate renewal pipeline, most likely on the same physical/virtual server.
Run ACME inside a Docker container, one instance (and credentials) for each domain name. Doesn't consume much resources. The real problem is IP addresses anyway, CT logs "thankfully" feed information to every bad actor in real time, which makes data mining trivially easy.
This is going to make it way easier to get publicly trusted certs for LAN servers that aren't internet facing.
I'm looking forward to every admin UI out there being able to generate a string you can just paste into a DNS record to instantly get a Let's Encrypt cert.
Really happy to see this.
In the meantime, if you use bind as your authoritative nameserver, you can limit an hmac-secret to one TXT record, so each webserver that uses rfc2136 for certificate renewals is only capable of updating its specific record:
I like this because it means an attacker who compromises "bob" can only get certs for "bob". The server part looks like this:I've changed my mind about the short lived cert stuff after seeing what is enabled by IP address certificates with the HTTP-01 verification method. I don't even bother writing the cert to disk anymore. There is a background thread that checks to see if the current instance of the cert is null or older than 24h. The cert selector on aspnetcore just looks at this reference and blocks until its not null.
Being able to distribute self-hostable software to users that can be deployed onto a VM and made operational literally within 5 minutes is a big selling point. Domain registration & DNS are a massive pain to deal with at the novice end of the spectrum. You can combine this with things like https://checkip.amazonaws.com to build properly turnkey solutions.
You should persist certs somewhere. Otherwise your availability is heavily tied to LE’s uptime.
Pretty risky given the rate limits of Let's Encrypt are non negotiable with no choice but to wait them out.
They are quite literally negotiable: https://isrg.formstack.com/forms/rate_limit_adjustment_reque...
There are also a bunch of rate limit exemptions that automatically apply whenever you "renew" a cert: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/#non-ari-renewals. That means whenever you request a cert and there already is an issued certificate for the same set of identities.
Yeessss! This should finally make certificates for internal only web services actually easier to orchestrate than before ACME. This closes probably the biggest operational pain point I've had with letsencrypt/modern web certificates.
Thank you so much to all inolved!
After having to deal with VM hosts that do GeoIP blocking, which unintentionally blocks Let's Encrypt and others from properly verifying domains via http-01/tls-alpn-01, I settled on a DIY solution that uses CNAME redirects and a custom, minimal DNS server for handling the redirected dns-01 challenges. It's essentially a greatly simplified version of the acme-dns project tailored to my project's needs (and written in node.js instead of Go).
Unfortunately with dns-persist-01 including account information in the DNS record itself, that's a bit of a show stopper for me. If/when account information changes, that means DNS records need changing and getting clients to update their DNS records (for any reason) has long been a pain.
There's a missing part here, and that's validating your ACME account ownership.
I think most users depend on automation that creates their accounts, so they never have to deal with it. But now, you need to propagate some credential to validate your account ownership to the ACME provider. I would have liked to see some conversation about that in this announcement.
I'm not familiar with Let's Encrypt's authentication model. If they don't have token creation that can be limited by target domain, but I expect you'll need to create separate accounts for each of your target domains, or else anything with that secret can create a cert for any domain your account controls.
> There's a missing part here, and that's validating your ACME account ownership.
Why? ACME accounts have credentials so that the ACME client can authenticate against the certificate issuer, and ACME providers require the placement of a DNS record or a .well-known HTTP endpoint to verify that the account is authorized to act upon the demands of whoever owns the domain.
If either your ACME credentials leak out or, even worse, someone manages to place DNS records or hijack your .well-known endpoint, you got far bigger problems at hand than someone being able to mis-issue SSL certificates under your domain name.
I'm surprised the ballot passed, unanimously even! I get that storing the DNS credentials in the certificate renewal pipeline is risky, but many DNS providers have granular API access controls, so it is already possible to limit the surface area in case the keys get leaked. Plus, you can revoke the keys easily.
The ACME account credentials are also accessible by the same renewal pipelines that has the DNS API credentials, so this does not provide any new isolation.
~It's also not quite clear how to revoke this challenge, and how domain expiration deal with this. The DNS record contents should have been at least the HMAC of the account key, the FQDN, and something that will invalidate if the domain is transferred somewhere else. The leaf DNSSEC key would have been perfect, but DNSSEC key rotation is also quite broken, so it wouldn't play nice.~
Is there a way to limit the challenge types with CAA records? You can limit it by an account number, and I believe that is the most tight control you have so far.
---
Edit: thanks to the replies to this comment, I learned that this would provide invalidation simply by removing the DNS record, and that the DNS records are checked at renewal time with a much shorter validation TTL.
> but many DNS providers have granular API access controls
And many providers don't. (Even big ones that are supposedly competent like Cloudflare.)
And basically everyone who uses granular API keys are storing a cleartext key, which is no better and possibly worse than storing a credential for an ACME account.
> It's also not quite clear how to revoke this challenge, and how domain expiration deal with this
CAs can cache the record lookup for no longer than 10 days. After 10 days, they have to check it again. If the record is gone, which would be expected if the domain has expired or been transferred, then the authorization is no longer valid.
(I would have preferred a much shorter limit, like 8 hours, but 10 days is a lot better than the current 398 day limit for the original ACME DNS validation method.)
We (Let’s Encrypt) also agree 10 days seems too long, so we are migrating to 7 hours, aligning with the restrictions on CAA records.
This wasn’t the first version of the ballot, so there was substantial work to get consensus on a ballot before the vote.
CAs were already doing something like this (CNAME to a dns server controlled by the CA), so there was interest from everyone involved to standardize and decide on what the rules should be.
Yes, you can limit both challenge types and account URIs in CAA records.
To revoke the record, delete it from DNS. Let’s Encrypt queries authoritative nameservers with caches capped at 1 minute. Authorizations that have succeeded will soon be capped at 7 hours, though that’s independent of this challenge.
This will make things so much easier.
Here, certbot runs in Docker in the intranet, and on a VPS I have a custom-built nameserver to which all the _acme-challenge are redirected to via NS records.
The system in the intranet starts certbot, makes it pass it the token-domain-pair from letsencrypt, it then sends those pairs to the nameserver which then attaches the token to a TXT record for that domain, so that the DNS reply can send this to letsencrypt when they request it.
All that will be gone and I thank you for that! You add as much value to the internet as Wikipedia or OpenStreetMap.
I'm really excited for this. We moved 120+ hand renewed certs to ACME, but still manually validate the domains annually. Many of them are on private/internal load balancers (no HTTP-01 challenge possible), and our DNS host doesn't support automation (no DNS-01 challenges either). While manually renewing the DCV for ~30 domains once a year isn't too bad, when the lifetime of that validity shrinks, ultimately to 9 days, it'd become a full time job. I just hope Sectigo implements this as quickly as LE.
For the love of god, switch to a DNS provider with an API. Whatever legacy behemoth you’re working with doesn’t justify a gap this wide.
Today I do the following:
/usr/bin/letsencrypt renew -n --agree-tos --email me@example.com --keep-until-expiring
Will I need to change that? Will I need to manually add custom DNS entries to all my domains?
PS To add, compared to dealing with some paid certificate services, LetsEncrypt has been a dream.
This adds a new validation method that people can use if they want. The existing validation methods (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/) aren't going away, so your current setup will keep working.
And to elaborate, the reasons you might want to use a DNS challenge are to acquire wildcard certificates, or to acquire regular certificates on a machine or domain which isn't directly internet-facing. If neither of those apply to you then the regular HTTP/TLS methods are fine.
OK I was sort of thinking that might be the case but wanted to make sure in case I had to start prepping now, thanks. We use no wildcard domains today, maybe down the road.
This is good news, not sure I got that from reading the article but even if I had to do it, it wouldn't be the end of the world I guess.
> The timestamp is expressed as UTC seconds since 1970-01-01
That should be TAI, right? Is that really correct or do they actually mean unix timestamps (those shift with leap seconds unlike TAI which is actually just the number of seconds that have passed since 1970001Z)?
Do leap seconds even matter here? Doing anything involving DNS or certificates in a way that requires clock synchronization down to the second would seem to be asking for trouble.
To get a Let's Encrypt wildcard cert, I ended up running my own DNS server with dnsmasq and delegating the _acme-challenge subdomain to it.
Pasting a challenge string once and letting its continued presence prove continued ownership of a domain is a great step forward. But I agree with others that there is absolutely no reason to expose account numbers; it should be a random ID associated with the account in Let's Encrypt's database.
As a workaround, you should probably make a new account for each domain.
You bothered to manage your LE accounts? I only say because when using the other two challenge types with most deployment scenarios you were generating a new account per cert so your account ID was just a string of random numbers.
I wonder why they switched from a super-secure-super-complex (in terms of operations) way of doing DNS auth to a super-simple-no-cryptography-involved method that just relies on the account id.
Why not using some public/private key auth where the dns contains a public key and the requesting server uses the private key to sign the cert request? This would decouple the authorization from the actual account. It would not reveal the account's identity. It could be used with multiple account (useful for a wildcard on the DNS plus several independent systems requesting certs for subdomains).
The most common vector for DNS-based attacks on issuance is compromised registrar accounts, and no matter how complicated you make the cryptography, if you're layering it onto the DNS, those attacks will preempt the cryptography.
Because LE keeps a mapping of account ids to emails and public keys. You have to have the private key to the ACME account to issue a cert. The cryptography is still there but the dance is done by certbot behind the scenes.
Prior to this accounts were nearly pointless as proof of control was checked every time so people (rightfully) just threw away the account key LE generated for them. Now if you use PERSIST you have to keep it around and deploy it to servers you want to be able to issue certs.
Is it possible to create an ACME account without requesting a certificate? AFAICT is is not so you cannot use this method unless you have first requested a certificate with some other method. I hope I am wrong!
An account needs to be created before you can request a certificate. Some ACME clients might create the account for you implicitly when you request the first certificate, but in the background it still needs to start by registering an account.
`certbot register` followed by `certbot show_account` is how you'd do this with certbot.
Great, thank you!
I really like and hate this at the same time.
Years ago, I had a really fubar shell script for generating the DNS-01 records on my own (non-cloud) run authoritative nameserver. It "worked," but its reliability was highly questionable.
I like this DNS-PERSIST fixes that.
But I don't understand why they chose to include the account as a plain-text string in the DNS record. Seems they could have just as easily used a randomly generated key that wouldn't mean anything to anyone outside Let's Encrypt, and without exposing my account to every privacy-invasive bot and hacker.
> they could have just as easily used a randomly generated key
Isn't that pretty much what an accounturi is in the context of ACME? Who goes around manually creating Let's Encrypt accounts and re-using them on every server they manage?
Those who choose to use DNS-PERSIST-01 should fully commit to automation and create one LetsEncrypt account per FQDN (or at least per loadbalancer), using a UUID as username.
There is no username in ACME besides the account URI, so the UUID you’re suggesting isn’t needed. The account uri themselves just have a number (db primary key).
If you’re worried about correlating between domains, then yes just make multiple accounts.
There is an email field in ACME account registration but we don’t persist that since we dropped sending expiry emails.
It’s still a valid point IMHO - why not just use the public key directly? It seems like the account URI just adds problems instead of resolving any.
Interesting.
I didn't realize the email field wasn't persisted. I assumed it could be used in some type of account recovery scenario.
This is a nice increment in ACME usability.
Once again I would like to ask CA/B to permit name constrained, short lifespan, automatically issued intermediate CAs. Last year's request: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43563676
Interesting. Think a lot of the security headaches went away for me when I discovered providers like CF can restrict the scope of tokens to a single domain and lock it to my IP.
Even CF cannot restrict the scope of a token to a single host.
Or a single DNS record.
This might be the first time in ten years that a certificate proposal intends to make issuing certificates more reasonable and not less. More of this, less of 7-day-lifetime stupidity.
"Support for the draft specification is available now in Pebble, a miniature version of Boulder, our production CA software. Work is also in progress on a lego-cli client implementation to make it easier for subscribers to experiment with and adopt. Staging rollout is planned for late Q1 2026, with a production rollout targeted for some time in Q2 2026."
This is significantly better than my draft of DNS-ACCOUNT-01. Thank you Let's Encrypt team!
Ah, the next step towards True DANE!
We then can just staple the Persist DNS key to the certificate itself.
And then we just need to cut out the middleman and add a new IETF standard for browsers to directly validate the certificates, as long as they confirm the DNS response using DNSSEC.
This decreases the salience of DANE/DNSSEC by taking DNS queries off the per-issuance critical path. Attackers targeting multitenant platforms get only a small number of bites at the apple in this model.
DNS queries are still part of the critical path, as let's encrypt needs to check that the username is still allowed to receive a cert before each issuance.
Sure. It's yet another advantage of doing True DANE. But it still requires DNS to be reliable for the certificate issuance to work, there's no way around it.
So why not cut out the middleman?
(And the answer right now is "legacy compatibility")
I mean, the reason not to do DANE is that nobody will DNSSEC-sign, because DNSSEC signing is dangerous.
Come on. It's not dangerous, it's just inconvenient and clumsy. So nobody is really using it.
Ok, it's inconvenient and clumsy in ways that make it easy to shoot oneself in the foot. But that's not dangerous?
When you shoot yourself in the foot with DNSSEC, you typically end up with a non-working setup.
The biggest problem is that DNS replies are often cached, so fixes for the mistakes can take a while to propagate. With Let's Encrypt you typically can fix stuff right away if something fails.
When you shoot yourself in the foot with DNSSEC, your entire domain falls of the Internet, as if it had never existed in the first place. It's basically the worst possible case failure and it's happened to multiple large shops; Slack being the most notorious recent example.