Now of course, I am shocked, shocked that politicians lie a lot. But moving beyond the cliche, I think is evidence is fascinating and important.
This research follows on from a tradition which supports that dishonest people self select into public service, in countries where it is more corrupt (so the rewards seem larger):
e.g. India:
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150029
I don't think this is specific to China at all (not to say there isn't cultural variance). It just happens to be a place where we have good data.
This research adds great data, and interesting insights:
- Plagiarism 15 years ago correlated with dishonesty today, and for a small payout. This is consistent with the theory that that some people are predictably dishonest, and even when the rewards are small.
- People who plagiarize are more likely to be promoted in 5 years.
- In the subset of judges in the sample, they could detect that the judgements of plagiarists were more friendly to the high-status litigants, but only if the trial had not been live-streamed to the internet.
Spillover effects:
- people who work for the "dishonest" Judges end up emulating their mentor's ruling patterns over time.
- "Dishonest" Lawyers secure higher win rates when they face "dishonest" judges.
The author concludes:
Institutions are only as good as the people inside them.
My experience supports this. There are always natural incentives to cheat, and thus it behooves society to construct costs to combat this. I don't think our modern society (private or public) does this well, and thus we are proportionally led by those who exploit the system, because they succeed by selection.
Politicians lie because they are incentivized to do so. The simple solution is to increase the costs of ethical violations to an absurd level and keep politicians’ conduct under constant investigation.
In the US Army, for example, 25% of general officers are constantly under investigation. This does not mean general officers are constantly breaking the law but that conduct is continuously examined in case they do. The consequences are sufficient to deter so much of the self serving behavior we commonly associate with US politicians. At that point the cost becomes too high for narcissistic personalities to enter that line of work.
Narcissistic personality deterrence is what we want from politicians, which cannot happen when politicians largely police their own conduct hidden behind secret alliances.
Found this research via the excellent episode of "Not Another Politics Podcast" (and adapted the title from them): https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/do-dishonest-people-se...
I suggest listening to it.
Now of course, I am shocked, shocked that politicians lie a lot. But moving beyond the cliche, I think is evidence is fascinating and important.
This research follows on from a tradition which supports that dishonest people self select into public service, in countries where it is more corrupt (so the rewards seem larger): e.g. India: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150029
And select out of of public service where it is trustworthy (e.g. Denmark): 2) https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20170688
I don't think this is specific to China at all (not to say there isn't cultural variance). It just happens to be a place where we have good data.
This research adds great data, and interesting insights:
- Plagiarism 15 years ago correlated with dishonesty today, and for a small payout. This is consistent with the theory that that some people are predictably dishonest, and even when the rewards are small.
- People who plagiarize are more likely to be promoted in 5 years.
- In the subset of judges in the sample, they could detect that the judgements of plagiarists were more friendly to the high-status litigants, but only if the trial had not been live-streamed to the internet.
Spillover effects: - people who work for the "dishonest" Judges end up emulating their mentor's ruling patterns over time.
- "Dishonest" Lawyers secure higher win rates when they face "dishonest" judges.
The author concludes: Institutions are only as good as the people inside them.
My experience supports this. There are always natural incentives to cheat, and thus it behooves society to construct costs to combat this. I don't think our modern society (private or public) does this well, and thus we are proportionally led by those who exploit the system, because they succeed by selection.
Politicians lie because they are incentivized to do so. The simple solution is to increase the costs of ethical violations to an absurd level and keep politicians’ conduct under constant investigation.
In the US Army, for example, 25% of general officers are constantly under investigation. This does not mean general officers are constantly breaking the law but that conduct is continuously examined in case they do. The consequences are sufficient to deter so much of the self serving behavior we commonly associate with US politicians. At that point the cost becomes too high for narcissistic personalities to enter that line of work.
Narcissistic personality deterrence is what we want from politicians, which cannot happen when politicians largely police their own conduct hidden behind secret alliances.